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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1992). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101 (1991) provides in pertinent part: 
(1) Any person who directly gives, sells, or otherwise 
provides liquor, leave at a location allowing consumption 
on thee premises, any alcoholic beverage, to the 
following persons, and by those actions causes the 
intoxication of that person, is liable for injuries in 
person, property, or means of support to any third 
person, or to the spouse, child, or parent of that third 
person, resulting from the intoxication: 
(a) any person under the age of 21 years; 
(b) any person who is apparently under the 
influence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages 
or products or drugs; 
(c) any person whom the person furnishing the 
alcoholic beverage knew or should have known 
from the circumstances was under the influence 
of intoxicating alcoholic beverages or 
products or drugs; or 
(d) any person who is a known interdicted person. 
(2) An employer is liable for the actions of !+-<= 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In addition to the facts set forth by Plaintiffs, the 
following undisputed facts are determinative of this appeal: 
1. A group of people, some of whom worked in the Molerway 
Salt Lake terminal and some who did not work for Molerway at all, 
decided to get together on a social basis.1 This group of people 
agreed to get together for this social outing on the weekend of 
August 17 and 18, 1991, which was a Saturday and Sunday.2 
2. The participants in the activity understood that it was not 
connected in any way with their employment with Molerway. Marci 
Mannion, who attended the outing, has testified: 
14o This social outing was not in any way connected 
with my employment with Molerway. My attendance was 
purely voluntary. It was simply an outing organized by 
people who happened to be working for Molerway. 
R.103. (Affidavit of Marci Mannion, f 14). Eight other employees 
1
 See R.89. affidavit of Jeff Steeger, f 5; R.94. 
affidavit of Ted Prokopis, f 5; R.98. affidavit of Marci Mannion, 
f 5; R.102. affidavit of Tony R. Pomikala, f 5; R.106. affidavit of 
John Edwards, $ 5; R.110. affidavit of Stephanie Bruns, f 5; R.114. 
affidavit of Nick Lopez, J 5; R.118. affidavit of Ira Owen, f 5; 
and R.122. affidavit of Fred Mower, J 5. 
2
 See R.89. affidavit of Jeff Steeger, f 6; R.94. affidavit 
of Ted Prokopis, f 6; R.98. affidavit of Marci Mannion, f 6; R.102. 
affidavit of Tony R. Pomikala, f 6; R.106. affidavit of John 
Edwards, 5 6; R.110. affidavit of Stephanie Bruns, f 6; R.114. 
affidavit of Nick Lopez, f 6; R.118. affidavit of Ira Owen, 5 6; 
R.122. affidavit of Fred Mower, 5 6; and R.125. Zuver deposition, 
p. 13. 
2 
attending the outing have testified likewise.3 
3. None of the employees were paid for their attendance at 
the party and the attendance of each was voluntary. Debra Zuver, 
the Plaintiff, has testified: 
Q. Then I presume that you were not being paid to attend 
this outing. Is that correct, not being paid by Molerway? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. No, you were not being paid? 
A. I was not being paid to attend the party. 
Q. Was your attendance at this party voluntary? 
A. Yes, it was. 
R.127. (Deposition of Debra Zuver, p. 34). John Edwards, another 
employee of Molerway that attended the party, has testified: 
This social outing was not in any way connected with my 
employment at Molerway. My attendance was purely 
voluntary. It was simply an outing organized by people 
who happened to be working for Molerway. 
R.107. (Affidavit of John Edwards, f 15 emphasis added). Others who 
attended the party have testified likewise.4 
3
 See R.90. affidavit of Jeff Steeger, 5 15, 16; R.95. 
affidavit of Ted Prokopis, f 14, 15, 16; R.99. affidavit of Marci 
Mannion, f 13, 14, 15; R.103. affidavit of Tony R. Pomikala, 5 14, 
15, 16; R.107. affidavit of John Edwards, f 14, 15, 16; R110. 
affidavit of Stephanie Bruns, f 14, 15, 16; R.lll. affidavit of 
Nick Lopez, f 14, 16; R.119. affidavit of Ira Owen, f 14, 15, 16; 
R.123. affidavit of Fred Mower, f 15, 16, 17. 
4
 See R.90. affidavit of Jeff Steeger, 5 16; R.95. affidavit 
of Ted Prokopis, f 15; R.99. affidavit of Marci Mannion, 5 14; 
R.103. affidavit of Tony R. Pomikala, f 15; R.lll. affidavit of 
3 
4. None of the guests who attended the party, including 
Debra Zuver, were reimbursed for any provisions which they brought 
for the party or for gas or other vehicle expenses. The Plaintiff, 
Debra Zuver, has testified: 
Q. Did you bring food? 
A. Yes, I did. 
*** 
Q. Who paid for that? 
A. I did. 
*** 
Q. Did you bring alcoholic beverages to the outing? 
A. Yes, sir. I did. 
Q. Who paid for those? 
A. I did. 
Q. Did you ever get reimbursed by Molerway for anything 
that you had brought? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Do you have any personal knowledge that Molerway 
reimbursed anybody for anything that was brought to that 
party? 
A. I believe it was done in a situation where no one 
expected to be paid back for bringing potluck items. 
R.128-129. (Deposition of Debra Zuver, pp. 28-29). Ir Owen, 
another employee of Molerway that attended the part} has; 
testified: 
Stephanie Bruns, 5 15; R.115. affidavit of Nick Lopez, f 15; R.119. 
affidavit of Ira Owen, f 15; R.123. affidavit of Fred Mower, f 16. 
4 
11. I was not reimbursed by Molerway for the 
beverages or provisions I personally brought to the 
outing. All funds expended by me came out of my own 
pocket and were not reimbursed by Molerway. 
R.119. (Affidavit of Ira Owen, f 11). Eight other employees have 
testified that they too were not reimbursed for items brought to 
the party. 5 
5. Molerway did not contribute towards the purchase of any 
drink — alcoholic or otherwise and any alcohol consumed at the 
outing was brought by the individuals who attended. The President 
of Molerway, Trygve Moler, has testified that "[ajbsolutely no 
funds or provisions (including alcohol) were contributed or 
provided by Molerway towards this social outing." R.85. Affidavit 
of Trygve Moler, f 9,6 Similarly, Stephanie Bruns, an employee of 
Molerway who attended the party, has testified: 
9. This social outing was on a "bring your own food 
5
 See R.85. affidavit of Trygve Moler, f 9; R.89-90. affidavit 
of Jeff Steeger, f 9, 10, 11; R.94-95. affidavit of Ted Prokopis, 
f 9, 10, 11; R.98-99. affidavit of Marci Mannion, f 9, 10, 11; 
R.102-103. affidavit of Tony R. Pomikala, 5 9, 10, 11; R.106-107. 
affidavit of John Edwards, f 9, 10, 11; R. 110-111. affidavit of 
Stephanie Bruns, f 9, 10, 11; R.114-115. affidavit of Nick Lopez, 
f 9, 10, 11; R.122-123. affidavit of Fred Mower, f 9, 10, 11. 
6
 See also R.89-90. affidavit of Jeff Steeger, f 9, 10, 11; 
R.94-95. affidavit of Ted Prokopis, f 9, 10, 11; R.98-99. affidavit 
of Marci Mannion, f 9, 10, 11; R. 102-103. affidavit of Tony R. 
Pomikala, J 9, 10, 11; R. 106-107. affidavit of John Edwards, f 9, 
10, 11; R. 110-111. affidavit of Stephanie Bruns, fl 9, 10, 11; 
R.114-115. affidavit of Nick Lopez, f 9, 10, 11; R.118-119. 
affidavit of Ira Owen, f 9, 10, 11; R.122-123, affidavit of Fred 
Mower, 5 9, 10, 11; and R.129. Zuver deposition, p. 29. 
5 
and drink" basis. Molerway did not contribute towards the 
purchase of any drink—alcoholic or otherwise, nor did 
Molerway contribute towards the purchase of any other 
item. Molerway did not provide any funds at all. It was 
not an event sponsored or promoted by Molerway. 
R.110. (Affidavit of Stephanie Bruns, f 9). 
6. Because all attendees voluntarily attended this outing in 
their individual capacity, no one was expected to adhere to any of 
Molerway's rules, regulations, or policies and no specific person 
was in charge or responsible for anyone's actions while attending 
this outing.7 Nick Lopez has testified that: 
16. Because the social outing was an event entirely 
separate and apart from my employment with Molerway and 
was not sponsored nor promoted by Molerway, there was no 
specific person in charge, therefore, no one was expected 
to adhere to any of Molerway's rules, regulations or 
policies. Jeff Steeger was not in charge; everyone could 
do what they wanted and come and go as they pleased. 
R.115-116. (Affidavit of Nick Lopez, f 16) 
7. Jeff Steeger and Ted Prokupis had absolutely no authority 
to act on behalf of Molerway in connection with this activity. 
Trygve Moler, the President of Molerway, has testified that "Jeff 
Steeger had absolutely no authority whatsoever to act on behalf of 
Molerway in any manner in connection with this activity." R.85. 
7
 See also R. 90-91. affidavit of Jeff Steeger, f 18; R.95, 
affidavit of Ted Prokopis, f 16; R.99-100. affidavit of Marci 
Mannion, f 15; R. 103-109. affidavit of Tony R. Pomikala, f 16; 
R.107. affidavit of John Edwards, f 16; R.lll. affidavit of 
Stephanie Bruns, f 16; R.115-116. affidavit of Nick Lopez, f 16; 
R.120. affidavit of Ira Owen, f 16; R.124. affidavit of Fred Mower, 
1 17. 
6 
(Affidavit of Trygve Moler, f 7). Jeff Steeger has also testified 
that he "had absolutely no authority whatsoever to act on behalf of 
Molerway in any manner in connection with this activity.11 R.90. 
(Affidavit of Jeff Steeger, f 17) . Ted Prokupis testified likewise. 
R.95. (Affidavit of Ted Prokupis, f 17). 
8. Molerway has never provided or contributed funds or 
provisions, nor sponsored or promoted social outings or any other 
activities for their employees at the Salt Lake City terminal in 
the past nor did they provide or contribute any funds or 
provisions, nor sponsor or promote this outing at Yuba Reservoir.8 
Jeff Steeger testified that: 
Molerway has never provided or contributed funds or 
provisions, nor sponsored or promoted social outings or 
any other activities, including Christmas parties, for 
their employees at the Salt Lake City terminal in the 
past nor did they provide or contribute funds or 
provisions, nor sponsor or promote this outing at Yuba 
Reservoir. 
R.91. (Affidavit of Jeff Steeger, f 19) 
9. Jeff Steeger inquired of his superiors at Molerway as to 
whether he could use a Molerway truck to transport picnic tables, 
3
 See R.86. affidavit of Trygve Moler, f 10, 11; R.95-96. 
affidavit of Ted Prokopis, f 18; R.100. affidavit of Marci Mannion, 
1 16; R.104. affidavit of Tony R. Pomikala, f 17; R.107-108. 
affidavit of John Edwards, f 17; R.111-112. affidavit of Stephanie 
Bruns, f 17; R.116. affidavit of Nick Lopez, 5 17; R.120. affidavit 
of Ira Owen, f 17; R.124. affidavit of Fred Mower, f 18. 
7 
barbecuesf and firewood to the picnic site. Permission was 
granted.10 
10. The predominant purpose of the party was to serve the 
social aspect of the guests. R.167-186. (Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Molerway's First Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 2-
8, 10, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. Molerway cannot be held liable for the alleged sexual 
assault committed by Ted Prokupis. The Utah Supreme Court has held 
that "as a matter of law the sexual misconduct of an employee is 
outside the scope of employment." Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 
P. 2d 1053 (Utah 1989). Thus, under no circumstances can Molerway be 
held liable for Mr. Prokupis' alleged sexual assault. 
11. Jeff Steeger was properly granted summary judgment. The 
Plaintiffs had to present some evidence which indicated that Mr. 
Steeger believed there was a "substantial certainty that harm will 
result" from his alleged failure to assist the Plaintiffs. Mathesor 
v. Pearson, 619 P.2d 321, 322 (Utah 1980). Mr. Steeger's affidavit 
indicates that he believed that any relationship betwe n Ted 
Prokupis and Debra Zuver was consensual and in fact initiat \ by 
9
 See R. 85, affidavit of Trygve Moler, f 6; R. 90, affidavit 
of Jeff Steeger, f 12. 
10
 Id. 
8 
Debra Zuver. Mr. Steeger observed Mr. Prokupis and Ms. Zuver 
several times during the night and found both were clothed and 
essentially nothing was going on. R.264. (Affidavit of Jeff 
Steeger, J 1-18) 
Plaintiff contends that the jury could find that Mr. Steeger 
was not credible in making these statements. However, the Utah 
Supreme Court has held that the "trial court cannot consider the 
weight of testimony or the credibility of witnesses in considering 
a motion for summary judgment." Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291, 
1292 (Utah 1978). Since the Plaintiffs presented no evidence that 
Jeff Steeger believed anything other than that to which he 
testified in his affidavit, summary judgment was properly granted 
to Steeger. Thus, there was no liability to be imputed to Molerway 
and summary judgment for Molerway was also properly granted. 
III. Plaintiffs argued that Steeger witnessed the accident yet 
failed to protect the Plaintiffs. They argue that this constitutes 
negligent supervision for which Molerway can be held liable. 
However, the evidence conclusively demonstrates that Jeff Steeger 
was acting in his individual capacity at the party and therefore, 
had no duty to protect Plaintiffs. 
IV. Jeff Steeger was not acting in his official capacity when 
he planned the party. Trygve Moler, the President of Molerway, has 
testified that "Jeff Steeger had absolutely no authority whatsoever 
9 
to act on behalf of Molerway in any manner in connection with this 
activity." R.85. (Affidavit of Trygve Moler, f 7. Jeff Steeger has 
testified likewise. R.90. (Affidavit of Jeff Steeger, f 17. In 
order to avoid summary judgment, Plaintiffs had to present credible; 
evidence that Jeff Steeger was authorized. This they have failed to 
do. Instead, they merely state a factual conclusion that "Jeff 
Steeger was clearly in charge." R.164. (Affidavit of Debra Zuver, 
f 13). This is nothing more than a factual conclusion which cannot: 
be used to civoid summary judgment. Winter v. Northwest Pipeline 
Corp. , 820 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 1991). Such a factual statement does 
not provide any evidence that Jeff Steeger was authorized by 
Molerway to be in charge as opposed to his being in charge due to 
a strong personality. 
V.A. The employees attending the party were not within the 
scope of their employment because Molerway had no right to control 
these individuals. Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 80]. 
P.2d 934, 937 (Utah 1989). The Plaintiff Debra Zuver has testified 
that she attended the party voluntarily and on her own free time,, 
She also testified that she was not being paid by Moler ay for 
attending the party. She testified that she brought alcohol o the 
party and did not expect to be reimbursed. There is no evi ance 
that Molerway provided any provisions, food, or beverages to the 
party. Under these circumstances, Molerway had no right to control 
10 
these individuals. Molerway submits that as a matter of law, an 
employer cannot control the actions of its employees while they are 
on their free time and are not being paid. 
V.B. Applying the factors set forth by the Utah Supreme Court 
also leads to the conclusion that these employees were outside the 
scope of employment during the party. Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 
771 P.2d 1053, 1056-57 (Utah 1989). The first factor is that the 
conduct be of the general kind the employee is employed to perform. 
Molerway is a commercial trucking company. It does not hire its 
employees to hold parties or commit sexual assaults. Thus, the 
weekend activities were not of the "general kind the employee is 
employed to perform." The second factor is that the "employee's 
conduct must occur within the hours of the employee's work and the 
ordinary special boundaries of the employment." Birkner, 771 P.2d 
at 1057. This party occurred some 106 miles from the Molerway 
terminal and while the employees were enjoying their free time. 
This party was clearly not within the time and space of the 
employees' employment. The third factor is that "the employee's 
conduct must be motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of 
serving the employer's interests." Id. at 1057. This party did not 
contribute to Molerway's commercial freight business. The party was 
designed solely to serve the personal needs of those attending. 
Molerway does not benefit by that which the employees do on their 
11 
own free time and when they are not being paid. 
Plaintiffs argue that these individuals could, even though not 
authorized to act, bind the corporation because they were 
"improving working relationships through a social function." This 
notion that an employee can transform his actions into corporate 
actions simply by stating that they benefitted the employer is poor 
public policy. 
VI. Molerway believes that this appeal can be decided on th€: 
basis of one simple fact: the party was a social gathering. Th€i 
Utah Supreme Court has long held that: 
Conversely, if the predominant motivation and purpose of 
the activity is in serving the social aspect, or other 
personal diversion of the employee, even though there may 
be some transaction of business or performance of duty 
merely incidental or adjunctive thereto, the person 
should not be deemed to be in the course of his 
employment. 
Martinson v. W-M Ins. Agcy. , Inc., 606 P. 2d 256 (Utah 1980). Here, 
the employees were on their free time and were engaged in a 
personal party. Thus, applying Martinson, the employees were not 
acting within the scope of their employment and Molerway cannot be 
held liable for any of the actions of the employees. 
VII. Molerway cannot be held liable under the Utah Dramshop 
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101 (1991). This Court has held that 
that Act "does not apply to individuals in a non-commercial social 
setting." Sneddon v. Graham. 821 P.2d 1185 (Utah App. 1991) . 
12 
Plaintiffs1 argument that this party was commercial because 
Molerway allegedly planned and conducted the party is contrary to 
this ruling and should be rejected. 
VIII. Plaintiffs spend considerable time arguing that Milton 
Zuver had standing to enforce the minor Plaintiff's intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claim against Molerway and Jeff 
Steeger. However, as demonstrated above, there is no evidence that 
Jeff Steeger intended to injure the minor Plaintiff. Thus, there is 
no liability to impute to Molerway. Whether or not Milton Zuver has 
standing to enforce this claim is irrelevant because there is no 
evidence which supports the claim. On the basis of the foregoing, 
summary judgment was appropriately granted to Molerway. 
ARGUMENT 
OVERVIEW 
The real issue here is whether or not an employer can be held 
liable for the acts of its employees while they enjoy their free 
time. More particularly, is an employer liable when two or more of 
his employees interact socially on their free time? The following 
example illustrates the issues. 
Assume this Court decides to have a Christmas party. The Court 
wants all the employees to attend and to bring their spouses. The 
party will take place at one of the judge's homes after hours. No 
one is paid to attend the party, and there is no requirement that 
13 
any employee attend. Each member of the Court brings some item for 
the overall good of the party. No one is, or expects to be, 
reimbursed for the cost of bringing those items. News of the party 
is spread through the office because that is the most convenient 
place to tell people about the party. 
Under these circumstances, are the judges and their staff 
within the scope of employment? Is the State of Utah liable for the 
acts of the judges and their staff while on their free time? At 
base, the issues are when does an employer's liability for the 
actions of his employees cease and should an employer be held 
liable anytime two or more of his employees congregate socially? 
In its motion for summary judgment, Molerway alleged that it. 
could not be liable for the acts of the employees because they were: 
not in the scope of their employment while attending the party. 
Molerway also alleged that it could not be held liable for the 
allegedly improper acts of Ted Prokupis and Jeff Steeger. Molerway 
will first demonstrate that even if the party was within the scope 
of the employees' employment, it cannot be held liable for the 
alleged misconduct of Jeff Steeger and Ted Prokupis. Molerway will 
then demonstrate for this Court that the employees were not within 
the scope of their employment during the weekend party. 
14 
I. 
MOLERWAY CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF 
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR FOR THE ACTIONS OF DEFENDANT TED 
PROKUPIS 
The Plaintiffs brought claims against Ted Prokupis for assault 
and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress 
stemming from an alleged sexual assault upon the Plaintiff, The 
Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant Molerway liable for the action of 
Defendant Ted Prokupis under the doctrine of respondeat superior• 
However, Molerway cannot be held vicariously liable for the 
sexual misconduct of the Defendant Ted Prokupis or any other 
employee. In Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P. 2d 1053 (Utah 
1989) , the Utah Supreme Court held that "as a matter of law the 
sexual misconduct of an employee is outside the scope of 
employment." Id. at 1058 (citations omitted). The Utah Supreme 
Court explained its reasoning as follows: 
Although Flowers' misconduct took place during, or in 
connection with, therapy sessions, it was not the general 
kind of activity a therapist is hired to perform. More 
critical, it was not intended to further his employer's 
interest. On the contrary, it served solely the private 
and personal interest of Flowers. Neither Flowers nor 
Birkner thought their sexual contact was part of therapy-
-the service that Flowers was hired to provide. Flowers1 
conduct arose from his own personal impulses, and not 
from an intention to further his employer's goals. 
Id. at 1058. As in Birkner, any alleged sexual misconduct of the 
Defendant Ted Prokupis would have "served solely the private and 
personal interests of" Prokupis and just as sexual misconduct "was 
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not the general kind of activity a therapist is hired to perform", 
sexual misconduct is not the general kind of activity that the 
Defendant Ted Prokupis was hired to perform. 
Thus, under the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Birkner, the 
Defendant Molerway cannot be held liable for the acts of Defendant 
Ted Prokupis under the doctrine of respondeat superior and summary 
judgment was properly granted. 
II. 
DEFENDANT MOLERWAY CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE UNDER THE 
DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR FOR THE ACTIONS OF 
DEFENDANT JEFF STEEGER. 
Plaintiffs also alleged that Jeff Steeger intentionally 
inflicted emotional harm upon the Plaintiffs. Before the trial 
court, Molerway argued that it could not be held liable because the 
trial court granted summary judgment to Jeff Steeger on the grounds 
that he did not witness the assault or, in the alternative, did not 
intend the consequences of the assault. Therefore, because Jeff 
Steeger was without fault, there was no liability to impute to 
Molerway. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in 
favor of Jeff Steeger and Molerway. 
In order for an act to be intentional, the actor must tend 
the consequences of his actions or have in mind a substai ial 
certainty that harm will result from an intentional act. Matheson 
v. Pearson, 619 P.2d 321, 322 (Utah 1980). The Utah Supreme Court 
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has stated: 
An individual may undertake an intentional act, such as 
throwing the tootsie pop in this particular case, and if 
the act is undertaken without an intent to harm or a 
substantial certainty that harm will result from the act, 
the actor is not guilty of an intentional tort. Instead, 
in such a situation, the activity is properly classified 
as reckless disregard of safety or reckless misconduct. 
Such reckless misconduct results when a person, with no 
intent to cause harm, intentionally performs an act so 
unreasonable and dangerous that he knows or should know, 
it is highly probable that harm will result. As explained 
in comment (f) of Section 500, Restatement of Torts, 2d: 
"Reckless misconduct differs from intentional 
wrongdoing in a very important particular. 
While an act to be reckless must be intended 
by the actor, the actor does not intend to 
cause the harm which results from it. It is 
enough that he realizes or, from facts which 
he knows, should realize that there is a 
strong possibility that harm may result, even 
though he hopes or even expects that his 
conduct will prove harmless. However, a strong 
probability is a different thing from the 
substantial certainty without which he cannot 
be said to intend the harm in which his act 
results." 
It is this absence of intent to harm which renders 
reckless misconduct or reckless disregard of safety a 
form of negligence and not an intentional tort. 
Id. at 322-23. The intentional act of which Plaintiffs' complain is 
Jeff Steeger's failure to act when he allegedly witness the assault 
and the intentional consequence is the alleged emotional distress 
suffered by Plaintiffs. However, there was no evidence that Jeff 
Steeger intentionally failed to act nor did he know that harm would 
result. Jeff Steeger testified as follows: 
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7. When I noticed Debra at 3:00 p.m. she appeared to be 
intoxicated; she was slurring her words, having trouble 
walking and her eyes would wander. As the evening 
approached, she became loud, antagonistic and appeared to 
stagger when she walked. She continued to get worse 
because she continued drinking on into the evening. 
9. I noticed that it seemed that wherever Ted went Debra 
followed. She seemed to follow him around all day. 
12. After the incident with the stranger, I was at the 
camp fire and saw Debra go up to Ted and sit on his lap. 
She then started kissing him. She had been drinking a lot 
all day and appeared intoxicated. 
13. I then saw Debra take Ted by his hand and lead him to 
her truck and saw them climb into the back. 
14. A polaroid was taken of Ted and Debra as they were 
laying in the back of her truck. I saw those pictures and 
they showed them with their clothes on. The photos were 
subsequently destroyed. 
15. My wife and I checked on Ted and Debra approximately 
six or seven times and saw nothing happening. They 
appeared to be passed out. 
17. I heard no screams or any other noises coming from 
Debra1 s truck while Ted was in there. My wife and I were 
sleeping in our own truck which was less than three feet 
from Debra's truck. 
R.264-265. (Affidavit of Jeff Steeger, f 13-18). 
These facts demonstrate that from Jeff Steeger's perspective, 
there was nothing going on between Plaintiff and Ted Prokupis other 
than a consensual arrangement initiated by Debra Zuver. This 
testimony leads inextricably to the conclusion that Jeff Steeger 
did not intend any harm to the Plaintiffs, nor did he have in mind 
a "substantial certainty" that harm would result. 
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In order to avoid summary judgment, Plaintiff had to present 
some evidence demonstrating that Jeff Steeger did know that there 
was a "substantial certainty" that the harm would result. This the 
Plaintiffs failed to do. In their brief before this Court, the 
Plaintiffs simply state that "the trier of fact could find, 
especially in the latter stages of the sequence of events, that 
Steeger fhad in mind a belief (or knowledge) that given 
consequences were substantially certain to result.1" (Brief of 
Appellee, p. 21) . However, the Plaintiffs present no evidence 
demonstrating that Jeff Steeger believed anything other than that 
which he stated in his affidavit. 
In essence, the Plaintiffs only defense to Jeff Steeger!s 
motion for summary judgment was that a jury could find that Jeff 
Steeger was not credible—that he really did not believe what he 
stated in his affidavit. However, a party may not contend that the 
other party's witnesses are not credible in order to avoid summary 
judgment. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has held that "[t]he court 
cannot consider the weight of testimony or the credibility of 
witnesses in considering a motion for summary judgment." Sandberg 
v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291, 1292 (Utah 1978). 
On the basis of the foregoing, the trial court properly 
concluded that there was no evidence that Jeff Steeger intended the 
harm which resulted. Because Jeff Steeger could not be held liable 
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for the allegations that he intentionally inflicted emotional hanr. 
upon the Plaintiffs, there is no liability which can be vicariously 
imputed to Molerway. Thus, the summary judgment in favor of 
Molerway was proper. 
III. 
DEFENDANT MOLERWAY CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR NEGLIGENT 
SUPERVISION BECAUSE JEFF STEEGER HAS BEEN ABSOLVED OF 
LIABILITY 
The crux of the Plaintiffs' negligent supervision claim is 
that Jeff Steeger witnessed the alleged assault, yet failed tc 
protect the Plaintiff or supervise Ted Prokupis in ending the 
assault. R.6, (Complaint, f 26). According to the Plaintiffs, Jeff 
Steeger's failures in this regard are to be imputed to Molerway. 
However, the trial court ruled that: "There is absolutely no 
evidence that Steeger even witnessed the assault." R.282. (Minute 
Entry, page 1). Thus, the entire basis for the Plaintiffs' 
negligent supervision claim against Jeff Steeger and Molerway, that 
Jeff Steeger witnessed "he assault but failed to prevent it, is 
based on facts which the trial court ruled were without merit. On 
the basis of the foregoing, the Plaintiffs1 allegations against 
Molerway for negligent supervision must be dismissed. Moreover, as 
set forth below, it is undisputed that Jeff Steeger and Ted 
Prokupis were not acting in their official capacities at the time 
of the assault. Thus, Jeff Steeger had no duty to aid Plaintiffs 
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against the alleged assault. Summary Judgment was properly 
granted. 
In conclusion, the Utah Supreme Court has already held that 
the sexual misconduct of an employee cannot be imputed to an 
employer. Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1056-59 (Utah 
1989). Moreover, the evidence in this case indicates that Jeff 
Steeger did not act intentionally and therefore, there is no 
liability to impute to Molerway. 
Thus, even if the employees were acting within the scope of 
their employment during the party, Molerway cannot be held liable 
for any of the actions of Jeff Steeger or Ted Prokupis. Therefore, 
summary judgment was properly granted for Molerway. The remainder 
of this brief demonstrates that none of the employees were acting 
within the scope of the their employment during the party. 
IV. 
MOLERWAY CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE ACTIONS OF THOSE 
ATTENDING THE PARTY BECAUSE JEFF STEEGER WAS NOT ACTING 
IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY WHEN HE ORGANIZED THE PARTY. 
Plaintiff alleges that the party was sponsored, promoted, and 
conducted by Molerway. The only link between Molerway and the party 
was the involvement of Jeff Steeger, the manager of the Salt Lake 
terminal. Plaintiff alleges that Jeff Steeger planned the party and 
therefore, Molerway must be deemed to have vicariously planned the 
party. 
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However, the Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that 
Jeff Steeger was acting in his official capacity when he planned 
the party. The Plaintiffs have not even attempted to do so. On the 
other hand, Molerway presented the testimony of Trygve Moler, 
President of Molerway, who testified that "Jeff Steeger had 
absolutely no authority whatsoever to act on behalf of Molerway in 
any manner in connection with this activity." R.85. (Affidavit of 
Trygve Moler, 1 7) Jeff Steeger has also testified that he "had 
absolutely no authority whatsoever to act on behalf of Molerway in 
any manner in connection with this activity." R.90. (Affidavit of 
Jeff Steeger, fl 17). 
In order to avoid summary judgment, the Plaintiffs were 
required to present some evidence showing that Jeff Steeger was 
acting in his official capacity. This they have failed to do. 
Instead, Plaintiffs asked the trial court to assume that Jeff 
Steeger was acting officially. Only then could they establish a 
link between Molerway and the party. It is axiomatic that a party 
may not rely upon assumptions to avoid summary judgment, but 
instead must produce admissible evidence placing material issues 
into dispute. Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983). 
In an attempt to defeat summary judgment, Plaintiffs merely 
assert that "Jeff Steeger was clearly in charge" (Affidavit of 
Debra Zuver, 1 13) . This is nothing more than a factual conclusion 
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and opinion. The Utah Supreme Court has held that " [a] negations of 
a pleading or factual conclusions of an affidavit are insufficient 
to raise a genuine issue of fact." Winter v. Northwest Pipeline 
Corp.. 820 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 1991). Even if such statements were 
admissible, they do not suggest that Molerway placed Jeff Steeger 
"in charge" as opposed to his being "in charge" because people like 
Debra Zuver chose to follow his instructions due to his natural 
leadership ability. Plaintiffs have simply failed to present any 
evidence contradicting the statements of Jeff Steeger and Trygve 
Moler that Mr. Steeger was not authorized to conduct this party. 
Because there was no viable link between Molerway and the party, 
summary judgment for Molerway was proper. 
MOLERWAY CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE ACTIONS OF TED 
PROKUPI8 OR JEFF STEEGER BECAUSE THE EMPLOYEES WERE NOT 
ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT DURING THE 
PARTY. 
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, employers are held 
vicariously liable for the torts of their employees committed 
within the scope of their employment. See, generally, Birkner v. 
Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1056-59 (Utah 1989). The issue 
here is whether the employees attending the party were acting 
within the scope of their employment at the time of the alleged 
assault. Molerway respectfully submits that these individuals were 
not acting within the scope of their employment during the party. 
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A. MOLERWAY HAD NO RIGHT TO CONTROL THE ACTIONS OF THESE 
INDIVIDUALS AND, THEREFORE, CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE IE 
ACTIONS. 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the approach of the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency, Section 228,11 for determining if 
an individual is acting within the scope of his or her employment. 
Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1056-57 (Utah 1989). 
Both the Restatement provision and the Birkner analysis inquire: 
into whether the act was of the kind the employee was hired to 
perform, whether the act occurs within the authorized time and 
space limits of employment and whether the act is one to serve the* 
employer's purpose. Id. at 1056-57. 
The ultimate issue to be decided in applying these factors is; 
whether the employee is under the control of the employer at the 
time of the alleged tort. As the Supreme Court of Oregon hasi 
11
 Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 228 provides: 
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of 
employment if, but only if: 
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; 
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorize time and 
space limits; 
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to 
serve the master; 
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant aga *s1: 
another, the use of force is not unexpectable by Jie 
master. 
(2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment 
if it is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond 
the authorized time and space limits, or too little actuated 
by the purpose to serve the master. 
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stated: 
In reality, the question of whether the employer had a 
"right to control" the employee is merely another way of 
asking whether the activity in question occurred within 
the authorized limits of time and space, so that it is 
fair to make the employer vicariously liable for the 
conduct of the employee. 
Stanfield v. Loccarce. 588 P.2d 1271, 1275 (Or. 1978). 
Obviously, it would be patently unfair to hold an employer 
liable where it had no ability to control the actions of the 
employee and thus, had no ability to prevent the tort. Thus, the 
drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Agency explicitly noted: 
As stated in Section 220, one is a servant only if, as to 
his physical conduct in the performance of the service, 
he is subject to the control or the right to control of 
the master. Hence, there is no liability for the conduct 
of one who, although a servant in performing other 
service, is doing work as to which there is no control or 
right to control by the master. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 220 comment c. In this regard, the 
following has also been stated: 
Again, it is essential to the relation of employer and 
employee—and the rule, of course, is the same where it 
is contemplated that the employee shall act as the agent 
or representative of the employer or principal—that the 
employer shall have power and authority to direct and 
control the acts of the alleged employee. Having had this 
power, the employer or principal must respond in damages; 
having lacked it, he may not be held accountable. While 
the maxim respondeat superior is often said to be founded 
upon the principle that one who expects to derive profit 
or advantage done for him by another must answer for any 
injury which a third person may sustain from the doing of 
that act, the real test of liability is the power or 
right to control the employee rather than the benefit 
which may be derived from his services. 
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53 Am.Jur.2d, Master and Servant, § 413, at p. 422 (1970). 
The Utah Supreme Court made similar comments in holding that 
an employee is not in the scope of employment when "going and. 
coming" to the place of employment: 
The major premise of the "going and coming" rule is that 
it is unfair to impose unlimited liability on an employer 
for conduct of its employees over which it has no control 
and from which it derives no benefit. Therefore, the 
major focuses in determining whether or not the general 
rule should apply in a given case is on the benefit the 
employer receives and control over the conduct. 
Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 801 P.2d 934, 937 
(Utah 1989). 
As demonstrated in the Statement of Facts, Molerway had no 
right or ability to control the actions of those attending the: 
party. The Plaintiff Debra Zuver has testified that her choice to 
attend the party was voluntary. R.127. (Deposition of Debra Zuver, 
p. 34) . Moreover, Debra Zuver testified that she attended the party 
on her own free time and was not paid for attending the party. 
R.127. (Deposition of Debra Zuver, p. 34). The party occurred some: 
106 miles from the terminal where the employees worked. Debra Zuver 
further testified that she brought alcoholic beverages to the party 
and was not, and did not expect to be, reimbursed for the cost of 
those items. R.128-129. (Deposition of Debra Zuver, pp. 28-29). 
These facts are consistent with the testimony of nine other 
employees who attended the party. 
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Under these circumstances, Molerway had no right to control 
Debra Zuver or any of the other employees. It seems axiomatic that 
the employer's right to control ceases when the employee is no 
longer being paid or is in the employer's service. Thus, the 
general rule is that one "going and coming" to work are not within 
the scope of their employment. Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life 
Ins. Co., 801 P.2d 934, 937 (Utah 1989). Here, the employees were 
on the their free time and were not being paid. The employees paid 
for all the provisions used at the party. If Molerway had some 
ability to control what these employees did on their free time, it 
is left to wonder what that means of control would be. 
Debra Zuver counters these facts by simply stating that "I 
felt subject to Mr. Steeger's instructions and directives." R.164. 
(Affidavit of Debra Zuver, f 13) . The problem with such a 
contention is that it does not state any facts which would suggest 
that Molerway had a right to control Debra Zuver1s actions, or the 
actions of anyone else attending the party. Indeed, it is hard to 
imagine why Debra Zuver would feel "subject to" Jeff Steeger's 
instructions when she was on her free time and was not being paid 
by Molerway, and when she knew that the guests, and not Molerway, 
were providing all of the food and beverages to the party. Indeed, 
Molerway had no right to control whether or not Plaintiffs remained 
at the party, so it is difficult to imagine how Molerway could have 
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controlled her actions while she attended the party. 
Because there is no rational basis to suggest that Molerway 
had a right to control the actions of the employees, summary 
judgment was properly granted. 
B. MOLERWAY CANNOT BE HELD VICARIOUSLY LIABLE UNDER THE BIRKNER 
CRITERIA. 
The sarnie conclusion can be reached applying the factors set 
forth in Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P. 2d 1053, 1056-57 (Utah 
1989) . Under Birkner, the Plaintiff has the burden of proving the 
following three elements: 
First, an employee's conduct must be of the general kind 
the employee is employed to perform • . . that means that 
an employee's acts or conduct must be generally directed 
towards the accomplishment of objectives within the scope 
of the employee's duties and authority, or reasonably 
incidental thereto. In other words, the employee must be 
about the employer's business and the duties assigned by 
the employer, as opposed to being wholly involved in a 
personal endeavor. 
* * * 
Second, the employee's conduct must occur within the 
hours of the employee's work and the ordinary spacial 
boundaries of the employment. 
* * * 
Third, the employee's conduct must be motivated, at least 
in part, by the purpose of serving the employer's 
interest. 
Birkner v. Salt Lake County. 771 P.2d 1053, 1056-57 (Utah 1989). 
The first factor is the "employee's conduct must be of a 
general kind the employee is employed to perform." Clearly, 
Molerway does not hire its employees to have parties on the 
weekends awray from the place of business. More importantly, 
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engaging in alleged sexual assaults is not the "general kind" of 
activity which any of the employees were hired to perform. Thus, 
the first factor leads to the conclusion that the employees were 
not within the scope of their employment. 
The second Birkner criteria is that "the employee's conduct 
must occur within the hours of the employee's work and the ordinary 
spacial boundaries of the employment." Birkner, 771 P.2d at 1057. 
This party occurred over one hundred miles from the Molerway 
terminal and occurred on a weekend and while the employees were 
enjoying their free time. The party did not occur during the 
employees' work hours or anywhere near the location of the 
terminal. This factor also supports a finding for Molerway. 
The final factor is that "the employee's conduct must be 
motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving the 
employer's interest." Birkner, 771 P.2d at 1057. It is difficult to 
imagine how the party contributed to Molerway's business. Molerway 
has never hired an employee to conduct parties, nor has Molerway 
hired individuals to engage in sexual assaults. Molerway hires 
employees to carry cargo from point A to point B. The employees 
were not engaged in any business purpose at the time of the alleged 
assault or during the party. 
Plaintiff argues that "[ijmproving working relationships 
through a social function" is a business purpose for which Molerway 
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should be held liable. Brief of Appellant, p. 35. This contention 
may have merit if the employer authorized or participated in the 
party. However, the evidence is undisputed here that Jeff Steeger 
planned and conducted the party in his individual capacity and thai: 
Molerway was not involved in the party. 
The Plaintiffs claim that so long as the employer receives a 
benefit, it can be held liable whether or not it authorized the 
activity or whether it had any right to control the actions of the 
employees. In essence, the Plaintiffs' argument means that the 
employee has the right to "authorize himself" to do the act simply 
by stating that he is doing the act for the employer. But 
traditional principles of law indicate that power flows from the 
master to the servant. Plaintiff cannot transform her actions and 
those of her fellow employees into the actions of Molerway simply 
by stating that her actions at the party improved her working 
relationships which benefitted Molerway. 
Moreover, this argument is troubling because it opens the door 
to vast liability for employers. If two employees visit a tavern 
after work and drink to excess, is the employer liable if the 
employees injure someone while driving home? Is the employer liable 
if the injured person merely alleges that the employees were 
developing their "working relationship" at the tavern? Molerway 
submits that as a matter of public policy, it should only be held 
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liable for activities which it can control. Molerway cannot, and 
could not, control the employees at this party while they are on 
their free time and not being paid. 
The employees were not within the scope of their employment 
whether the "right to control" or Birkner tests are applied. As 
such, Molerway could not control the actions of these employees or 
prevent the alleged tort. On the basis of the foregoing, Molerway 
respectfully requests that the summary judgment be affirmed. 
VI. 
THE PARTY WAS A SOCIAL GATHERING AND, THEREFORE, THE 
EMPLOYEE8 WERE NOT ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THEIR 
EMPLOYMENT 
Molerway believes that this appeal can be decided on the basis 
of one simple fact: the party was a social gathering. As noted in 
the Statement of Facts, both parties agree that the party was 
primarily and predominantly social in nature. The Utah Supreme 
Court has long held that: 
Conversely, if the predominant motivation and purpose of 
the activity is in serving the social aspect, or other 
personal diversion of the employee, even though there may 
be some transaction of business or performance of duty 
merely incidental or adjunctive thereto, the person 
should not be deemed to be in the course of his 
employment. 
Martinson v. W-M Ins. Aqcy. , Inc., 606 P. 2d 256 (Utah 1980). Under 
Martinson, if the primary and predominant purpose is social in 
nature, then the individuals are not acting within the scope of 
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their employment as a matter of law. Here, the employees were on 
their free time and were engaged in a personal party. Thus, 
applying Martinson, the employees were not acting within the scope 
of their employment and Molerway cannot be held liable for any of 
the actions of the employees. 
VII. 
MOLERWAY CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE UNDER THE DRAMSHOP ACT 
BECAUSE THE PARTY WAS A NONCOMMERCIAL SOCIAL SETTING 
Plaintiff argues that Molerway can be held liable under the 
Utah Dramshop Act, Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101 (1991), in that 
Molerway provided alcohol to Ted Prokupis while he was intoxicated,, 
Plaintiff still has the burden of showing that the beer brought by 
Debra Zuver and Jeff Steeger can be said to be "brought" by 
Molerway. This issue rests upon the discussion above relating to 
authority and scope of employment. 
However, even assuming the alcohol can be attributed to 
Molerway, this Court has held that the L ah Dramshop Act "does not 
apply to individuals in a noncommercial social setting." Sneddon v > 
Graham, 821 P.2d 1185 (Utah App. 1991). Plaintiff argues Sneddon 
can be distinguished because the social setting ther was a 
household party whereas the social setting here was a pa: at a 
reservoir. Moreover, Plaintiffs claim the party hei was 
"commercial" because Molerway is a business. Molerway respectfully 
contends thcit the Legislature intended to impose liability upon 
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pubs, taverns, and bars. It did not intend to impose liability on 
everybody upon which clever plaintiffs can stick a "commercial" 
label. Molerway is not in the business of distributing liquor, and 
did not do so here. As such, Plaintiffs' argument should be 
rejected and summary judgment should be affirmed. 
VIII. 
THE CLAIM8 OF THE MINOR PLAINTIFF, DOWNY ZUVER, AND 
MILTON ZUVER WERE PROPERLY DISMISSED 
The minor Plaintiff, Downy Zuver, and Milton Zuver, brought 
actions alleging that Jeff Steeger and Molerway intentionally 
inflicted emotional distress upon the minor Plaintiff. In their 
brief, the Plaintiffs spend considerable time arguing that Milton 
Zuver had standing to sue on behalf the minor Plaintiff. 
However, even assuming that this is true, the Plaintiffs have 
still failed to present any evidence indicating that either Jeff 
Steeger or Molerway intended any harm to Downy Zuver. Without such 
evidence, the claim must be dismissed regardless of whether Milton 
Zuver has standing to make these allegations. Because the trial 
court properly ruled that Jeff Steeger did not intentionally injure 
the Plaintiffs, summary judgment in favor of Molerway was proper. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing, Molerway respectfully requests 
that summary judgment in favor of Molerway be affirmed. 
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